A year before she was deposed last week in a student uprising, Indian officials began to lobby their U.S. counterparts to stop pressuring Sheikh Hasina, the ironfisted prime minister of neighboring Bangladesh, The Washington Post reports citing U.S. and Indian officials.
U.S. diplomats had publicly harangued the 76-year-old Hasina for jailing thousands of her rivals and critics ahead of an election scheduled for last January. The Biden administration had sanctioned a Bangladeshi police unit under Hasina’s command accused of carrying out extrajudicial abductions and killings and had threatened imposing visa restrictions on Bangladeshis who undermined democracy or committed human rights abuses.
But in a series of meetings, Indian officials demanded that the United States tone down its pro-democracy rhetoric. If the opposition were allowed to gain power in an open election, Indian officials argued, Bangladesh would become a breeding ground for Islamist groups posing a threat to India’s national security.
“You approach it at the level of democracy, but for us, the issues are much, much more serious and existential,” said an Indian government adviser who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the private talks. “There were a lot of conversations with the Americans where we said, ‘This is a core concern for us, and you can’t take us as a strategic partner unless we have some kind of strategic consensus.’”
Ultimately, the Biden administration substantially softened its criticism and shelved threats of further sanctions against Hasina’s government, disappointing many in Bangladesh. U.S. officials say it was a calculated decision that had little to do with Indian pressure. Many details of the bilateral discussions and U.S. deliberations have not been reported previously.
Now, after protesters defied the army’s curfew orders and marched on Hasina’s official residence, compelling her to flee to India, policymakers in both New Delhi and Washington are forced to confront whether they mishandled Bangladesh.
“There is always a balancing act in Bangladesh, as there is in many places where the situation on the ground is complicated and you want to work with the partners you have in a way that is not inconsistent with what the American people expect,” said a U.S. official, who like several others interviewed spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s diplomatic sensitivity.
In the months leading up to the January election, divisions emerged within the U.S. government over how to handle Bangladesh. Some in the U.S. State Department, including then-Ambassador Peter Haas and other embassy officials, argued for a tougher stance against Hasina, particularly since President Joe Biden had campaigned on a foreign policy plank of restoring democracy, people familiar with the matter said. Haas, who has since retired, declined to comment.
Other U.S. officials felt there was little to be gained from further alienating Hasina and risking the safety of U.S. diplomats, including Haas, who had received threats from Hasina’s followers.
Some White House officials also considered the downside of antagonizing India, which made a series of appeals to the U.S. that it moderate its pressure on Hasina, including when Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh met with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in November in New Delhi, according to the people familiar with the matter. Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval also played a key role in presenting the Indian case during a visit to Washington that autumn, one of those people said.
“The U.S. approach to Bangladesh was always one that tried to both be consistent with our values — and we spoke about those publicly on many occasions — but also pragmatic about the reality that the situation in Bangladesh was very complicated and that there were a number of interests that we had there and that other countries had there,” said the U.S. official. “We needed to try to find a constructive way to engage with that administration, as we do in all places. So our policy was much more about trying to strike a balance between both of those things.”
For India, the dramatic developments in Bangladesh have turned a spotlight on its decade-long, all-in bet on Hasina, even as she grew autocratic and unpopular. For the United States, the episode has highlighted a growing dilemma: While India is seen by the Biden administration as a crucial partner in countering China, India itself is increasingly viewed by its smaller neighbors in South Asia as a meddling, aggressively nationalist power under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
In January, after Hasina claimed victory in a one-sided election with many of her opponents in jail or in hiding, Indian officials endorsed the election results, fueling calls from the Bangladeshi opposition for a boycott of Indian imports. Last year, in the tiny Indian Ocean country of the Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu rose to power as president by campaigning on an “India Out” platform. And in Sri Lanka, anti-Indian sentiment flared this year after Modi claimed on the campaign trail that his opponents gave India’s rightful territory cheaply away to Sri Lanka.
“The U.S. has built its relationship with India and has this tendency to defer to its wishes in the region, and probably nowhere was that more evident than Bangladesh,” said Jon Danilowicz, a retired U.S. diplomat who served as deputy chief of mission in Dhaka. “But the risk is like Iran 1979: If you’re seen as colluding with the dictator, when the dictator falls, you’re left playing catch-up.” (The United States strongly backed the autocratic shah of Iran before he was overthrown during the Islamic Revolution.)
Now, Danilowicz added, “New Delhi and Washington have to show some humility and acknowledge they got Bangladesh wrong by not siding with the Bangladeshi people and their democratic aspirations.”
U.S. officials have strongly disputed the characterization that they were swayed by Indian lobbying. Blinken had led efforts to reduce violence and encourage a fair and free election in its run-up, said a State Department official. “Both Sheikh Hasina herself and opposition leaders said the Secretary’s steps reduced violence,” the official said. “After the elections, which were neither free nor fair, some criticized the U.S. for not imposing more restrictions on Bangladeshis, falsely attributing this to Indian influence.”
After Hasina’s ouster, which followed weeks of unrest in which hundreds of protesters were killed, Indian officials have publicly changed tack and expressed willingness to work with whoever comes to power. Last week, Modi sent his “best wishes” to Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel Prize-winning banker who took charge of Bangladesh’s interim government, even though he criticized India for backing Hasina. Yunus has called for new, free and fair elections once stability is restored in the country.
The State Department endorsed Yunus, with spokesman Matthew Miller saying the United States hoped to see “the Bangladeshi people decide the future of the Bangladeshi government.”
Aside from the United States, India had simultaneously warned other Western governments about the dangers of the opposition Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP) returning to power. “It was intense,” recalled an official from a Western country allied with the United States. “They started briefing Western governments that Bangladesh could become the next Afghanistan, that the BNP could lead to instability, violence and terror.”
Indian officials say they have reason to feel burned by the Bangladeshi opposition. During the rule of Hasina’s rivals, the BNP, in the mid-2000s, militants smuggled weapons to attack northeast India and trained in camps inside Bangladesh with the help of Pakistani intelligence, Indian officials say. Indian and U.S. officials say this experience with BNP rule explained why India had been so adamant on keeping Hasina in power for 15 years.
In recent days, Indian officials have warned that the Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist political party, could gain power, and Indian media have reported on a spike in attacks on Bangladesh’s Hindu minority population in the days since Hasina was deposed.
BNP leaders, who could win if elections are soon held, say they have met Indian officials in recent years to mend ties and assure them that India — and Hindus in Bangladesh — would be safe if India stopped propping up Hasina and the BNP returned.
“We’ve been in touch with India, trying to tell them, ‘Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,’” said Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury, a senior BNP leader. “We have tried to assuage whatever concerns India has. It would be stupid for both sides to carry the baggage of the past.”
As India grapples with the shock of suddenly losing one of its closest allies, Indian foreign policy circles and media have been awash with speculation that Washington orchestrated the removal of Hasina, who has long had a chilly relationship with the United States. U.S. officials have staunchly denied the claim.
Others in New Delhi say India was to blame for propping up an autocrat for so long. A former senior Indian national security official said it made sense, in theory, to support Hasina, but New Delhi did not grasp the situation on the ground.
“Everybody who came from Dhaka were giving the same feedback that anti-India feelings are at an unprecedented level, yet we calculated that she has full control over the administrative and coercive arms of the state,” the former Indian official said. “We thought repeated attempts to destabilize the government have failed, so she will manage again. The truth is, the whole thing just needed a spark to set the whole house on fire.”
